Fairness opinions provided by investment banks advising on mergers and acquisitions have been criticized for being conflicted in aiding bankers further their goal of completing the deal as opposed to aiding boards (and shareholders) by providing an honest appraisal of deal value. We find empirical support for this criticism. We find that shareholders on both sides of the deal, aware of the conflict of interest facing advisors, rationally discount deals where advisors provide fairness opinions. The reputation of the advisor serves to mitigate this discount, while the contingent nature of advisory fees appears to have no impact. Furthermore, consistent with the criticism of fairness opinions, we find evidence suggesting that fairness opinions are sought by boards for the legal cover they provide against shareholders unhappy with the deal's terms. Thus, altogether our findings suggest that investment bankers and boards may be complicit in using fairness opinions to further their own interests at an expense to shareholders. 
Introduction
In evaluating merger and acquisition (M&A) proposals, corporate boards often seek third party assessments of the "fairness" of the financial terms of the proposed transaction to shareholders. Although these so-called "fairness opinions" can be provided by entities specializing in valuation -accounting firms, consulting firms or appraisers for instance, they are for the most part provided by investment banks who also act as advisors on the deal. In recent years, the practice of advisors providing fairness opinions has generated considerable controversy.
1 Critics contend that boards seek fairness opinions for the "legal cover" they provide against disgruntled shareholders and that investment banks oblige by opining favorably on deals that may otherwise be financially inadequate to realize deal-contingent advisory fees. Investment banks counter such claims by arguing that their proximity to the firm and intimacy with the deal's terms uniquely disposes them to attest to the fairness of the financial terms involved in the transaction. The controversy surrounding fairness opinions has attracted widespread attention from the business press, industry participants, lobbyists and regulatory bodies. Yet, there is limited academic evidence on the basis of which to assess the practice of advisors providing fairness opinions. 2 In this paper, we provide empirical evidence relevant to assessing the merits of the arguments made on both sides of the controversy.
In their role as advisors, investment banks help firms find the appropriate suitor and negotiate the deal and its financial terms (merger premium). It is conceivable that advisors may indeed be in a better position to "certify" the merger premium they helped determine through a fairness opinion because of their familiarity with the company and their intimacy with the deal's terms. Alternatively, it is also conceivable that advisors may act opportunistically by issuing a fairness opinion that ratifies an otherwise financially inadequate offer to oblige a board seeking legal cover in order to preserve the continuity of their business relationships or to guarantee their fees from deal completion. Whether fairness opinions are net beneficial to shareholders or not thus depends on which of these two effects --the "certification" or the "conflict of interest" effect --dominates on average. This is an empirical issue and the focus of our study.
The main criticism leveled at advisors providing fairness opinions is that they ratify financially inadequate offers as "fair". Despite the absence of objective criteria established by rule-making bodies to judge whether an offer is "fair" from a "financial point of view", such criticisms nevertheless imply that the merger premiums received by targets are "low", and that their shareholders are consequently harmed when advisors provide fairness opinions. Using merger premiums in deals where a non-advisor provides a fairness opinion as a benchmark, we find that merger premiums are indeed low if target advisors provide fairness opinions. However, relative to when non-advisors provide fairness opinions, merger premiums are also low if acquirers obtain fairness opinions from their advisors, which may suggest that such opinions can benefit at least acquiring shareholders. Furthermore, when there are advisor-provided fairness opinions on both sides of the deal, the merger premiums are lower compared to when there are non-advisor provided fairness opinions on both sides of the deal. These findings on merger premiums should however not be interpreted to conclude that target shareholders lose out while acquiring shareholders gain when fairness opinions are sourced from advising investment banks.
Although the differences in acquirer and target perspectives and the observed merger premiums are informative, they do not definitively tell us whether acquirer or target shareholders ultimately benefit or lose for two reasons. First, it may well be that acquiring shareholders expect even lower merger premiums to be appropriate under the circumstances. Thus, an absence of a theoretical expected premium against which to benchmark the observed premium makes it difficult to determine whether shareholders benefited from the deal. Second, advisors help negotiate the terms of the deal to arrive at a premium that they can ratify with a fairness opinion, implying that merger premiums and fairness opinions are jointly determined and endogenous.
This endogeneity can arise either because it is in situations involving low merger premiums that the certifying role of a fairness opinion is required, or because fairness opinions are provided opportunistically to ensure that deals involving low merger premiums consummate. Thus, merger premiums and their ratifying fairness opinions need to be considered jointly in any assessment of the benefits to shareholders.
Consequently, we examine how shareholders respond at the time of the merger announcement to the merger premium conditioned by the presence of an advisor (non-advisor)-provided fairness opinion to determine if advisor (non-advisor)-provided fairness opinions are beneficial to shareholders. A positive shareholder reaction to the merger premium conditioned by the presence of a fairness opinion would imply a certifying fairness opinion, while a negative reaction a conflicted one. We find that shareholders on either side of the deal react negatively to merger premiums ratified by the advisor-provided fairness opinions, implying that shareholders do not perceive advisor-provided opinions to be beneficial. Shareholders, aware of the conflict of interest facing the advisor, thus rationally discount their valuation of the deal when the advisors provide the fairness opinions. The reaction of acquirer shareholders to advisors ratifying the merger premium offered is particularly striking because it is precisely such deals that were associated with lower merger premiums, suggesting that shareholders perceived these "low" premiums to be still excessive. The reaction is however consistent with Cain's (2007) finding that acquirer advisors are optimistic in their valuations of the merger premiums offered.
If shareholders perceive the average advisor-provided fairness opinion to be conflicted, one would expect investment bankers, aware of the possibility of shareholder discounting, to "signal" the quality of their certification through their reputation. Press reports cite investment banks rebutting claims of providing conflicted opinions by pointing to the risks to their reputation capital from doing so. When we examine the role of advisor reputation, we find that the merger premiums that reputable advisors opine on are higher than the merger premiums that less reputable advisors opine on. Moreover, we find that target shareholders perceive fairness opinions provided by reputable advisors to be credible in that they do not react negatively to the merger premiums certified by such advisors. We are not able to empirically distinguish such an effect on the acquirer side. Our results thus provide some support for the claims made by investment banks that their reputation helps them commit against opportunistic behavior and effectively certify deal value.
Deal-contingent advisory fee contracts have also featured prominently in the fairness opinion controversy as influencing the advisor's motive in providing a fairness opinion.
Investment banks argue that deal-contingent fees ensure that the fairness opinions they provide are in the best interest of shareholders, while critics single out these same contingent fees to buttress their claims of conflict of interest when advisors provide fairness opinions. Other critics contend that even non-contingent advisory fees would result in favorable opinions because providers risk the loss of future fees if they opine unfavorably. Whether deal-contingent or flat fees influence fairness opinions to be provided in the best interest of shareholders is thus an empirical question. We find that although merger premiums are higher in deals where target advisors have contingent fee contracts, shareholders perceive advisor-provided fairness opinions to be conflicted irrespective of whether the advisor has a deal-contingent advisory fee contract or not.
Finally, conflicts of interest between the firm's managers and shareholders may also play a role in determining whether advisor-provided fairness opinions are beneficial to shareholders.
Managers may pursue deals to realize private benefits to the detriment of shareholders.
Independent boards, aware of such a possibility, would seek fairness opinions from their advisors to monitor management and ensure that the deal is in the best interest of the shareholders.
Captured boards on the other hand would seek fairness opinions for the "legal cover" they provide against shareholders unhappy with the deal. To support their case, critics have also argued against advisor-provided fairness opinions on the grounds that they serve to provide the legal cover that boards seek. They point out that fairness opinions are not required by regulation or statute. Rather, it is the board's decision whether to seek a fairness opinion, the scope of the opinion and who it should seek it from. They contend that given that the board has the option of seeking fairness opinions from a firm not serving as an advisor, or to structure payments without a contingency fee, the observed practice of seeking fairness opinions from advisors implies that boards seek fairness opinions for the legal cover they provide against shareholders unhappy with the terms of the deal, knowing fully well that the incentives they provide to investment bankers would result in the desired outcome of an obliging fairness opinion. We find that in deals where insiders own small stakes in the firm (and hence are more likely to pursue deals where they trade off lower merger premiums for higher private benefits) target shareholders react negatively (positively) when insider (outsider) dominated boards obtain fairness opinions to ratify the merger premium received. We however find no such evidence on the acquirer side. These findings support the critics' claims that although fairness opinions are sought for the ostensible purpose of certifying the deal value, boards often seek them for the legal cover they provide against disgruntled shareholders.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief description of fairness opinions and the controversy they have generated, and review related academic literature. In section three, we provide sample related details. We present our empirical analyses of fairness opinions, merger premiums and shareholder abnormal returns in section four. We conclude in section five with a summary of our findings.
Fairness opinions
A fairness opinion in a merger or acquisition is a third party assessment of the deal price in relation to company value. The fairness opinion is issued in the form of a letter addressed to the target or acquirer board and dated as of the date the board meets to vote and announce the proposed transaction. Unless the engagement letter executed at the time the banker is recruited specifies otherwise, there is no obligation on the part of the banker to update (or in industry parlance "bring down") the opinion to a later date. This opinion letter is subsequently included as an exhibit to the relevant statements filed with the SEC in conjunction with the proposed transaction.
The fairness opinion speaks only to the fairness of the transaction from a financial point of view in a restrictive way. The opinion does not address whether the price or consideration to be received or paid by the shareholders represents the best or highest price. Instead, all that it speaks to is that the price is in the range of fair values. The opinion does not address the merits of the transaction relative to alternative courses of action that the board may adopt, nor does it constitute a recommendation to shareholders about actions to be taken to consummate the proposed transaction. In providing a fairness opinion, the banker avows all responsibility for independent verification of the information publicly available or furnished by management and used in the valuation.
According to the trade paper "The Daily Deal", the rule of thumb pricing for fairness opinions is 25% of the advisory fee. It is an additional charge paid regardless of whether the deal closes or not. In most cases, the exact fees are not public knowledge as there is no regulatory filing requirement, but are thought to range from a few thousand to millions of dollars.
Fairness opinions were introduced into the M&A calculus through a Delaware Supreme Court (the Court) ruling in a case involving the sale of Trans-Union Corporation to the Pritzker family (Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, Del. 1985) . Despite the offer involving a premium for Trans-Union shareholders, the Court found that the board of Trans-Union, while acting in good faith had nonetheless been grossly negligent in recommending the merger by not making an informed decision, and therefore in violation of its "duty of care" to its shareholders. 3 In its ruling, the Court stated that obtaining a fairness opinion would have helped the board fulfill its duty of care to shareholders. Although it did not specify any legal credentials for fairness opinion providers, nor mandate the use of fairness opinions in M & A's, the Court did stress that the providers of fairness opinions be "qualified and independent". In doing so, the Court sought to ensure that when evaluating a merger or takeover proposal, corporate directors inform themselves of information that was reasonably available and relevant to the decision. 4 The Van Gorkom ruling is usually credited for the practice of obtaining fairness opinions in M&A transactions.
Critics contend that the intent behind the ruling is rarely preserved in practice. They claim that the lack of independence that arises from the material relationships that investment banks share with firms in their advisory capacity creates a conflict of interest that compromises their ability to render an objective fairness opinion. They argue that the "success fees" investment banks stand to collect if the deal goes through, leads them to "do what it takes" to opine favorably and effectively "rubber stamp" such deals. As evidence they point to the fact that fairness opinions are loaded with legal disclaimers, out of date by the time shareholders vote on the deal, and so narrowly focused on the specifics of the deal that they do not address the possibility of other potentially superior alternatives available to shareholders. The allegations of conflicts of interest have attracted the attention of the New York Attorney General's Office and the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), and prompted an inquiry into the matter by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD).
Wall Street firms defend the practice of providing fairness opinions, arguing that it is important for a company to receive a fairness opinion from its advisor on the transaction because the advisor, having helped negotiate the transaction or brought it to the firm's attention in the first place, is most familiar with the company and the terms of the deal. They claim to manage any conflicts that arise by having special committees of senior management review such opinions.
They further argue that the risk to their reputations and the contingent nature of their advisory fees aligns their incentives with those of the shareholders. The industry's main lobbying group, the Securities Industry Association (SIA) and the M&A attorneys' lobbying group, the M&A committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, have declared the status quo as adequate and intensified their efforts to preempt any potentially far-reaching regulatory changes.
Fairness opinions have been the subject of several law studies. Bebchuk and Kahan (1998) examine the judicial reliance on fairness opinions and critically consider the extent to which courts should give weight to fairness opinions. Bowers (2002) assesses the extent to which the Van Gorkom ruling encouraged the use of fairness opinions and the influence it had on the revenues that investment banks derive from M&A advisory services. Bowers and Latham (2004) examine whether boards seek fairness opinions to resolve valuation uncertainty or to protect themselves against legal liability. Our study differs from those in the law literature in that it seeks to determine if shareholders perceive the certification provided by fairness opinions as valuable.
Three contemporaneous studies also examine fairness opinions in M&A. Cain (2007) legal cover to acquirers. In contrast to these studies, our approach to studying fairness opinions explicitly recognizes that the value of advisor-provided fairness opinions to shareholders cannot be ascertained without considering the endogenous nature of merger premiums and fairness opinions. Furthermore, our approach also recognizes that unless the deal is used as a unit of analysis, where after all a single merger premium is co-determined for a deal with the help of both acquirer and target advisors, it is difficult to reconcile the differences observed in the relationship between merger premiums and fairness opinions from both sides of a deal.
Sample

Sample details
To construct the sample for empirical analysis, we start with all mergers and tender offers available in the Securities Corporation Database (SDC) Merger and Acquisition File for the years 1980 to 2004. From this set of 6,488 deals, we eliminate deals where SDC does not identify the advisors on either the target or acquirer side (3,191 deals), deals which are pending, incomplete, or withdrawn (38 deals), minority acquisitions --deals where the acquirer does not obtain a majority stake in the target subsequent to the acquisition (378 deals), cleanup offers -where the acquirer holds more than 50% of the target shares prior to the acquisition, and private acquisitions --deals where we cannot obtain the requisite target or acquirer data from CRSP and COMPUSTAT data (952 deals). This process yields a sample of 1927 deals.
We use the institutional assignments reported on SDC to identify deals with and without fairness opinions. For every institution associated with the deal, SDC reports whether it was an advisor and whether it was additionally involved in the following capacities: initiating the deal, representing shareholders, board of directors, seller, major holder or other claimants, as a dealer manager, lead or other underwriter, and as a fairness opinion provider. If an institution was involved as an equity participant and/or arranged financing, it is not reported unless it performs any of the above mentioned roles.
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Approximately 59% of all deals in the sample have a fairness opinion on either side of the deal. About half of all the deals in the sample have a fairness opinion on the target side (53.14%), a third a fairness opinion on the acquirer side (30.88%), and a quarter have fairness opinions on both sides (24.75%). There are multiple fairness opinions on the target side in 124 deals, and on the acquirer side in 39 deals. Table 1 presents the yearly distribution of sample deals with a fairness opinion on either side and on the target and acquirer sides. A disproportionate number of the deals with fairness opinions on either the target or acquirer side appear in the latter half of the 1990s, paralleling the increased merger activity during that time period.
5 Kisgen et al. (2007) note that SDC does not comprehensively report the presence of fairness opinions. Thus, we may be classifying deals where a fairness opinion is present as not having one. However, this should impart a conservative bias to our study in that it biases us against finding any results associated with fairness opinions. To ensure that we have enough observations with a reported fairness opinion on SDC, we sample over a 25-year period as opposed to Kisgen et. al. (2007) who sample a 10-year period. Table 2 presents the distribution of target (acquirer) fairness opinions in the sample by target (acquirer) industry. Excluding the one deal in the public administration industry, there is no remarkable pattern in the distribution of fairness opinions across industries. opinions less often when the offer is hostile, the acquirer makes a tender offer for the target's shares, the method of payment is cash, the acquirer is small or when they have few growth options. Similarly, acquirers seek fairness opinions less often in hostile, cash tender offers where there is competition to acquire the target. They, however, obtain a fairness opinion more often if they are acquiring a target of similar size in the same industry. These patterns may be explained by SEC Rule 14a-9 which requires firms to disclose material information to shareholders when seeking their vote on a proposed transaction or when issuing shares that are in excess of 20% of the outstanding shares to finance the transaction. Thus fairness opinions, which are considered material information, are less likely to be observed in hostile tender offers and in cash-financed mergers, and more likely in negotiated, stock-financed transactions.
Fairness opinion use
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Both targets and acquirers seek fairness opinions more often when they commit to an agreement through termination fee agreements. Table 4 identifies the major fairness opinion providers in our sample. The top five and eight out of the top ten providers of fairness opinions are identical for both targets and acquirers.
Fairness opinion provision
To 
Empirical Results
1. Fairness opinions and merger premiums
We compute three measures of premium offered to targets using both the "component"
and "price" data provided by SDC, and express it as a percentage of the target's share price four weeks prior to the announcement of the offer. The first measure is computed by aggregating the amount of each form of payment to the target (equity, debt, cash, etc.). The second and third measures use the final and initial price per share of target stock offered by the acquirer with no consideration given to the method of payment. Table 5 presents descriptive statistics on these measures of deal premiums broken down by the presence or absence of a fairness opinion in the deal and on the target and acquirer sides. Although one would expect the three measures of premium to be consistent, the premium computed using component data is systematically higher than the premiums computed using price data. This seems to be particularly the case in the extremes of the distribution as reflected in the means across the various measures. Moreover, these measures produce extreme values, some of which are economically meaningless (below zero).
Hence, as in Officer (2003), we compute a fourth "combined" measure (MP) that integrates both the component and price measures but eliminates outliers in both distributions.
This combined measure is the premium computed using component data if it falls between 0% and 200% (the lower bound of 0% is economically meaningful but the upper bound of 200% is arbitrary). If it does not, the combined measure is the recomputed using initial price data (or final price data if the initial price data is missing) provided it produces a premium between 0% and 200%. If both these conditions are not met, the combined premium is recorded as a missing observation. It is this measure of merger premium that is used in all our analysis. To further examine merger premiums, we deconstruct the deals with a fairness opinion into deals (a) where the advisor provides the fairness opinion (conflicted fairness opinion) (b)
where the advisor does not provide the fairness opinion (independent fairness opinion), and (c)
where there is both a conflicted and an independent fairness opinion. without an acquirer fairness opinion. In contrast, both Panels B and C also show that the merger premiums in deals with a target (acquirer) independent opinion are no different from those deals without a target (acquirer) fairness opinion. The sub-sample of deals where there is both a conflicted and an independent fairness opinion is small (33 on the target side and 6 on the acquirer side), precluding any meaningful comparisons. Thus, at the univariate level, it appears that fairness opinions provided by deal advisors are associated with lower merger premiums.
We next examine the association between fairness opinions and merger premium in a regression framework, controlling for factors that are correlated with the use of fairness opinion and have been shown to have an impact on merger premiums. The dependent variable in all our regressions is MP, the combined measure of merger premium. Our base regression specification contains a set of explanatory variables identified from a vast literature aimed at explaining merger premiums. This literature includes but is not limited to Huang and Walkling (1987) , Bradley et al. (1988) , Comment and Schwert (1995) , Betton and Eckbo (2000) , Officer (2003) and Bates and Lemmon (2003) . Specifically, this literature finds that merger premiums are higher when the attitude of target management towards the bid is hostile, the mode of acquisition is a tender offer, the method of payment is cash, the target has a poison pill, both sides of the deal have termination clauses, and when multiple bidders compete for the target. Consequently, in our base specification we include dummy variables that indicate whether the bid is hostile (HOSTILE), the mode of acquisition is a tender offer (TENDER), the payment for the target is in cash (CASH), the target has a poison pill (POISON), the acquirer and target have termination fee agreements (ATERMF and TTERMF), and if there are multiple bidders for the target (COMPETITION).
Merger premiums have also been observed to be lower when the acquirer obtains a toehold in the target firm or seeks to acquire a target with high market capitalization or high market to book ratio. Hence, we also include a dummy variable TOEHOLD, which takes the value of 1 if the fraction of the target stock held by the acquirer on the bid announcement day is greater than 5%
and 0 otherwise, the target's market capitalization (TarMVE), and market to book ratio (TarM2B). Finally, we also control for the acquirer's market capitalization (AcqMVE), market to book ratio (AcqM2B), and whether both the acquirer and target are in the same industry (SIND) or are financial firms (FINSERV). 8 The regressions are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares and coefficient standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional clustering across observations involving the same acquirer. Table 7 presents the results of our regression analyses. Consistent with the prior literature, all our regression models indicate that higher merger premiums are associated with deals involving acquirers with high market capitalizations. Premiums are also higher in deals where there is competition to acquire the target, the target has a poison pill and in intra-industry deals. Lower premiums are associated with deals involving targets with high market capitalizations and market to book ratios, and in deals involving members of the financial services industry.
In Model 1, we add to the base specification, two dummy variables, TarFO and AcqFO, which take on the value of 1 if the target or acquirer has a fairness opinion, respectively, and is 0 otherwise. We also add an interactive dummy TarFO X AcqFO to capture the presence of a fairness opinion on both sides of the deal. The coefficients on all these three dummies are not statistically significant. Yet, when we control for who provides the fairness opinion, salient differences emerge.
In Model 2, we add to Model 1 three dummies -TarConfFO, AcqConfFO and an interactive dummy TarConfFO X AcqConfFO. TarConfFO (AcqConfFO) is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the target (acquirer) fairness opinion is conflicted and 0 otherwise.
This regression specification allows us to examine the association between merger premiums and fairness opinions based on whether the advisor provided the fairness opinion or not. All the coefficients on the six fairness opinion related dummy variables are statistically significant at conventional levels. The coefficient on the TarFO dummy is 0.08 while that on the TarConfFO dummy is -0.12, implying that relative to deals without a fairness opinion, the merger premiums are on average 8% higher when the target obtains a fairness opinion but 4% lower if the opinion is from its deal advisor (and 20% higher if the target obtains a fairness opinion from a nonadvisor). An identical relationship between merger premiums and fairness opinions is observed on the acquirer side as well. The coefficients on the AcqFO and AcqConfFO dummies indicate that, relative to deals without a fairness opinion, merger premiums are 16% higher when the acquirer obtains a fairness opinion, but 5% lower if the opinion is from its deal advisor. When there is a fairness opinion on both sides of the deal, the sum of the coefficient on the TarFO X AcqFO interactive dummy and the coefficients on the TarFO and AcqFO dummies indicate that the merger premiums are 8% higher relative to deals without a fairness opinion. However if there is a conflicted fairness opinion on both sides of the deal, the coefficient on the TarConfFO X AcqConfFO dummy along with the coefficients on the TarConfFO and AcqConfFO dummies indicate that merger premiums are 13% lower relative to deals without a fairness opinion.
In 
Fairness opinions, merger premiums and abnormal returns
To determine whether advisor-provided fairness opinions are beneficial to shareholders we next analyze how shareholders respond to the merger premiums offered in deals conditioned by the presence or absence of a fairness opinion. Table 8 The mean acquirer CAR in the 62 deals with an independent fairness opinion is -0.64% and is statistically greater than the acquirer CARs observed in deals without a fairness opinion, although there is no difference in the medians. Interestingly, Panel C also shows that target CARs are lower in deals with an acquirer fairness opinion when compared with deals without an acquirer fairness opinion.
We next examine the CARs in a multivariate context using a regression model similar to the base model employed to examine merger premiums but with two differences. The dependent variable in our model is the target (acquirer) CAR, and the model includes MP conditioned by the presence and absence of a fairness opinion as an independent variable in addition to all the other independent variables in the base merger premium model. The dependent variable in Model 1 is the target CAR and in Model 2 it is the acquirer CAR. Table 8 presents the results of our regression estimation.
In Model 1, the coefficient on the MP variable is 0.20 and is statistically significant indicating that the merger premium offered positively influences the target shareholder's announcement reaction. The coefficient on the variable MP X TarFO is -0.07 and is statistically significant, implying that target shareholders react less positively (by 7% less) if the merger premium is certified by a target fairness opinion relative to when it not certified by a fairness opinion. Additionally, the statistically insignificant coefficient on the variable MP X TarConfFO implies that the negative effect associated with target fairness opinions is no different whether the fairness opinion is provided by the target advisor or not. The presence of an acquirer fairness opinion does not materially impact the reaction of the target shareholders to the merger announcement.
In Model 2, the coefficient on MP is -0.02 and is statistically significant, indicating that the premium offered negatively influences acquirer shareholder reactions to the merger announcement. The coefficient on the MP X AcqFO variable is insignificant, but the coefficient on the MP X AcqConfFO variable is -0.07 and is statistically significant, implying that when the premium offered to targets is certified by a fairness opinion provided by the deal advisor, acquirer shareholders react even more negatively to the merger announcement relative to when the merger premium is not certified by a fairness opinion. This negative effect due to a conflicted fairness opinion on the acquirer side remains despite the presence of a conflicted fairness opinion on the target side of the deal (MP X AcqConfFO + MP X TarConfFO X AcqConfFO).
These regression results provide evidence that both target and acquirer shareholders perceive the average advisor-provided fairness opinion to be conflicted. The negative shareholder response also implies that shareholders, aware of the conflicts, rationally discount the certification of the deal that advisors provide through fairness opinions.
Advisor Reputation
In formulating fairness opinions, investment banks have substantial subjectivity and discretion through which to affect the outcome of the valuation exercise. Since there is no codified set of "best practices" to follow in issuing fairness opinions to ensure exacting valuations, the wide latitude available to investment banks in the valuation process subjects them to the risk of reputation loss over unreasonable opinions. As advisors on deals, investment banks routinely engage in valuing deals to help firms negotiate an acceptable premium. Reputation developed by the investment bank as a deal advisor can thus serve as a credible signal of the quality of the certification provided through a fairness opinion. Investment banks allude to their reputation to rebut claims of conflicts in the provision of fairness opinions by pointing to the scrutiny they face from sophisticated institutional investors every time they write fairness opinions, and claim to manage any conflicts that arise by having special committees of senior management review such opinions. If investment bank advisors stand to suffer losses to their reputation capital when they provide fairness opinions opportunistically, as they claim, then highreputation advisors would be more apt to provide fairness opinions that are in the shareholders' best interests.
To test for this possibility, we first examine the relationship between merger premiums and the reputation of the advisor providing the fairness opinion. In Table 10 , Model 1, we add to our base model for MP our fairness opinion dummies (TarFO, TarConfFO, AcqFO, AcqConfFO) and two interactive dummies that capture whether the advisor providing the fairness opinion is a high reputation advisor (TarConfFO X TarHirep, AcqConfFO X AcqHirep). The TarHirep (AcqHirep) dummy takes on the value of 1 if the target (acquirer) advisor is a top 10 M&A advisor over our sample period, and is 0 otherwise. The coefficient on the TarConfFO dummy is -0.09 and is statistically significant. In contrast, the coefficient on the TarConfFO X TarHirep dummy is 0.06 and is also statistically significant. The coefficients on these two dummies imply that, relative to the merger premium in deals without a fairness opinion, merger premiums are lower when the target advisor provides a fairness opinion, but less so if the advisor is reputable.
The AcqConfFO dummy is -0.14 and is statistically significant while the AcqConfFO X AcqHirep dummy is insignificant, implying no relationship between advisor reputation and merger premiums on the acquirer side. To test whether target shareholders perceive fairness opinions provided by reputable advisors as credible, we run Model 3 in Table 10 . The dependent variable in Model 3 is the target CAR. In addition to control variables used previously in the CAR models in Table 9 , we include MP and two interaction variables, MP X TarFO and MP X TarFO X TarHirep as independent variables. The negative and significant coefficient on MP X TarFO (-0.06) confirms that target shareholders discount deals certified by a fairness opinion. However, the positive and significant coefficient on MP X TarFO X TarHirep (0.06) reveals that target shareholders perceive deals certified by a fairness opinion from a reputable advisor to be credible. A similar exercise with acquirer CARs (not reported in the Table) does not suggest any role for advisor reputation on the acquirer side.
Contingent advisory fees
Critics contend that the undesirable incentives facing advisors to complete otherwise financially inadequate deals due to the contingent nature of their advisory fees compromises their ability to provide unbiased fairness opinions. 10 For instance, in response to the NASD notice requesting comment on whether the issue should be addressed from a regulatory perspective, the AFL-CIO raised doubts over "how any board of directors can rely on a fairness opinion provided by an investment bank when the lion's share of that bank's fee is contingent on the underlying transaction closing". Investment banks counter such claims by arguing that it is the contingent nature of their fee contract that aligns their incentives with those of the shareholders (Davis and Langley, 2004) . Concerns over the influence of deal-contingent fees on the fairness opinions provided by advisors has led to extreme proposals calling for an outright ban on advisors 10 Contingent fee contracts can be either a constant percentage of deal value, where the advisor is paid a fixed percentage of the deal value (typical for a target advisor), or a constant dollar form where the advisor is paid a fixed dollar value irrespective of deal value (typical for an acquirer advisor). While both types of contingent contract provide the incentive to complete the transaction, the constant percentage type provides target advisors an incentive to increase the deal value. Acquirer advisors, however, do not face any explicit contractual incentives to lower deal value given the difficulty in writing such a contract. McLaughlin (1990 McLaughlin ( , 1992 provides a detailed study of the fee contract structures and their incentive properties.
providing fairness opinions (see comment letters filed by CALPERS and AFL-CIO in response to the NASD notice on February 1, 2005 and January 10, 2005, respectively).
As a less extreme step, several legal scholars have proposed mandating that boards obtain a second fairness opinion from an independent bank that does not have a stake in the transaction other than the fee for the fairness opinion as a way of dealing with the conflict of interest in advisor provided fairness opinions (Bebchuk and Kahan, 1989; Elson et al., 2003) . The idea of organizations being set up to deliver unbiased fairness opinions has been applauded by prominent observers. For instance, Paul Volcker, the former chairman of the Federal Reserve has commented that "… if there was ever going to be a market for this kind of thing it will be now. It strikes me that it would be very valuable. A lot of mergers are promoted for the benefit of those involved". Others have argued that such independent opinions would not ameliorate the problem as the independent banks rendering them are effectively dependent in practice. Davidoff (2006) and Sorkin (2005) point out that so-called independent banks would be more likely to rubberstamp a fairness opinion than banks with a long-term relationship with the firm as they have more to lose by not accommodating the companies that hire them. To paraphrase Sorkin (2005) , "If an "independent" firm was called in to issue a fairness opinion and refused to do so, who would hire it again?" Whether contingent fee contracts serve to align the incentives of fairness opinion providers any more than flat fee contracts is thus an empirical issue.
To investigate the relationship between contingent fee contracts and merger premiums, we run Model 2 in Table 10 . Model 2 is similar to Model 1 except that it now includes two interaction terms to capture advisors with contingent fee contracts providing fairness opinions (TarConfFO X TarContingent and AcqConfFO X AcqContingent). TarContingent (AcqContingent) is a dummy that takes on the value of 1 if the target (acquirer) advisor has a contingent fee contract, and is 0 otherwise. The coefficient on the TarConfFO X TarContingent dummy is 0.12 and is statistically significant, implying a positive relationship between target advisors with contingent fee contract providing fairness opinions and merger premiums. On the acquirer side, there appears to be no relationship between the contingent nature of the advisor's fee contract, fairness opinions and merger premiums.
We examine if target shareholders perceive fairness opinions to be credible if they are provided by advisors with contingent fee contracts in Model 4 in Table 10 . Model 4 is identical to Model 3 except that it includes two variables, MP X TarConfFO and MP X TarConfFO X TarContingent, and replaces the variable MP X TarFO X TarHirep. The coefficient on the MP X TarFO variable is -0.05 but loses its statistical significance relative to Model 2 in Table 9 due to the loss of 370 observations for which we do not have data on the nature of the advisors contract.
The coefficients on both the MP X TarConfFO and MP X TarConfFO X TarContingent variables are insignificant indicating that target shareholders do not factor the contingent nature of the advisor's contract in their assessment of the credibility of the fairness opinion.
Legal cover
Thus far, we have focused on the "supply side effects" relating to the conflicts facing the advisors providing fairness opinions. We now examine "demand side effects" that arise from the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders in seeking a fairness opinion.
A consequence of the hostile takeover wave of the 1980s was that firms adopted a number of effective takeover defenses which decreased the probability of a successful hostile takeover and resulted in the 1990s largely being an era of friendly mergers. With takeover defenses having shifted the balance of power in target firms away from shareholders and towards management, bidders in the 1990s had to focus their efforts on convincing target management to agree to the merger as opposed to enticing shareholders with large premiums and bypassing management as they had done in the 1980s. A way to successfully consummate a merger at a low price (premium) was to offer target management private benefits from the deal in the form of attractive positions and remuneration packages in the combined firm, to induce them to approve the merger (Hartzell et al., 2004) . Arguing that the cost to shareholders of blocking such transactions rises with management control, Moeller (2005) finds support for this argument in the form of a positive association between merger premiums in the 1990s and target shareholder control. Acquirer management may be similarly motivated to seek private benefits from the deal at the expense of acquirer shareholders. Grinstein and Hribar (2004) find that managerial power results in mergers that result in private benefits to acquirer management in the form of merger bonuses but are not necessarily in the best interests of the acquirer shareholders.
In such an environment, fairness opinions could play a critical part. Independent boards, concerned about the possibility of management seeking to enter into deals to realize private benefits would want to monitor against such a possibility and may use a fairness opinion as a certification instrument to assure themselves that the deal is in the interests of shareholders.
Alternatively, as critics argue, captured boards seeking to protect management and themselves may seek a fairness opinion for the legal cover it provides against shareholders unhappy with the deal's terms. Several characteristics associated with fairness opinion use suggest this latter possibility. First, as Tables 1 and 3 indicate, despite the Van-Gorkom ruling being in 1985, a majority of the fairness opinions appear in friendly mergers in the 1990s. Second, although management controlled firms could seek to reassure shareholders that the deal does not enrich management at the expense of shareholders by obtaining a fairness opinion from a non-advisor, such instances are few. Third, "unfair" opinions are never observed. Investment bankers claim to negotiate the terms of the deal to arrive at a price at which a fairness opinion can be delivered.
If the private benefits drive managements to enter into deals and captured boards seek fairness opinions for legal cover reasons from advisors who in turn are happy to accommodate in order to realize deal related fees, then advisor provided fairness opinions in such deals should be detrimental to their shareholders. To test this argument, we run Model 5 which is similar to Model 3 in Table 10 . We construct a dummy variable, TarInsider, which takes on the value of 1 if the percentage of shares owned by insiders is less than the median ownership of 5.79% for the sample, and 0 otherwise to proxy for the potential for management to trade off lower merger premiums for higher private benefits from the deal. We also construct a dummy variable, TarInsideBoard, which takes on the value of 1 if more than half the board members are insiders and 0 otherwise, to represent captured boards. We obtain the data on insider ownership and board composition from the Disclosure database. The three variables of interest in this regression are MP X TarFO, MP X TarFO X TarInsider and MP X TarFO X TarInsider X TarInsideBoard. The coefficients on the first two variables are insignificant while it is -0.10 and is statistically significant on the third, indicating that shareholders value fairness opinions sought by independent boards when the potential for management to trade off lower merger premiums for higher private benefits exists, but discount them when captured boards seek fairness opinions in similar situations. A similar exercise on the acquirer side does not yield any significant results.
We interpret our findings as providing support to critics' claims that while boards seek fairness opinions for the purpose of certifying deal value they often obtain them for the legal cover they provide against shareholders unhappy with the deal.
Conclusion
It is common for boards to seek fairness opinions in M&A transactions with the ostensible purpose to vet the transaction. It is routine for investment banks to provide such fairness opinions while advising on the same transaction. Critics contend that this practice is fraught with conflict of interest. They contend that boards seek fairness opinions for the legal cover they provide against disgruntled shareholders, and investment banks, motivated to earn advisory fees that are payable only upon the successful consummation of the deal, are only too happy to acquiesce. The investment banking industry has countered in defense of current practice. They claim that their intimate knowledge of the terms of the deal as advisors allows for a better appraisal of the proposed transaction. Further, they point out that for reputation reasons, and because of the contingent nature of their advisory fees, their interests are aligned with those of shareholders.
Table 1 Distribution of fairness opinions across years
The sample consists of 1927 mergers and tender offers from 1980 to 2004 identified from the Securities Data Corporation's (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions Database. The sample consists of deals where the target (acquirer) is present on both the CRSP and COMPUSTAT databases and has advisor data available on SDC. The sample only includes deals where the acquirer holds less than 50% of the target's shares prior to the acquisition, and upon completion of the acquisition, owns a majority of the target's shares (greater than 50%). Table 2 Distribution of fairness opinions across industries
Deals With
Fairness Opinions Target Fairness Opinion Acquirer Fairness Opinion
The sample consists of 1927 mergers and tender offers from 1980 to 2004 identified from the Securities Data Corporation's (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions Database. The sample consists of deals where the target (acquirer) is present on both the CRSP and COMPUSTAT databases and has advisor data available on SDC. The sample only includes deals where the acquirer holds less than 50% of the target's shares prior to the acquisition, and upon completion of the acquisition, owns a majority of the target's shares (greater than 50%). Target and Acquirer industry classifications are based on the 2-digit SIC code from CRSP. Table 3 Descriptive statistics for target, acquirer and deal Characteristics
Targets Acquirers
The (acquirer) is present on both the CRSP and COMPUSTAT databases and has advisor data available on SDC. The sample only includes deals where the acquirer holds less than 50% of the target's shares prior to the acquisition, and upon completion of the acquisition, owns a majority of the target's shares (greater than 50%). Target and Acquirer industry classifications are based on the 2-digit SIC code from CRSP. HOSTILE is a dummy variable equal to one if SDC records the bid as "hostile" or "unsolicited" and zero otherwise. TENDER and CASH are dummy variables equal to one if the bid involved a tender offer or a payment of cash (even if there were other associated methods of payment) and zero otherwise. SIND is a dummy variable equal to one if both the target and the acquirer are from the same two-digit SIC industry. POISON is a dummy variable equal to one if that target has a poison pill in place at the time of the merger or tender offer and zero otherwise. PHELD is the percentage of the target's stock held by the acquirer on the bid announcement date. TOEHOLD is a dummy variable equal to one if PHELD is greater than 5% and zero otherwise. COMPETITION is a dummy variable equal to one if another bid is recorded by SDC and zero otherwise. TTDEAL and EQUAL are dummy variables equal if the deal was two-tiered or was classified as a "merger of equals" by SDC respectively and zero otherwise. TarTF and AcqTF are dummy variables equal to one if the target or the acquirer had a termination fee contract respectively and zero otherwise. TarMVE and AcqMVE are the market values of the target and acquirer (in $ millions) on the day prior to the merger announcement. TarM2B and AcqM2B are market to book ratios for the target and acquirer respectively computed using COMPUSTAT data from the year of the bid. *** and ** indicate that the mean values are different between the fairness opinion and no fairness opinion sub-samples at the 1% and 5% level respectively. Table 4 Institutions providing fairness opinions
Target Acquirer
The (acquirer) is present on both the CRSP and COMPUSTAT databases and has advisor data available on SDC. The sample only includes deals where the acquirer holds less than 50% of the target's shares prior to the acquisition, and upon completion of the acquisition, owns a majority of the target's shares (greater than 50%). Highlighted institutions are among the top 5 advisors in mergers and acquisitions over our sample period. (acquirer) is present on both the CRSP and COMPUSTAT databases and has advisor data available on SDC. The sample only includes deals where the acquirer holds less than 50% of the target's shares prior to the acquisition, and upon completion of the acquisition, owns a majority of the target's shares (greater than 50%). The different premium measures are computed using SDC data. The premium offered to target shareholders is computed as the percentage the acquirer's offer is above the market value of the target's shares four weeks prior to the announcement of the offer. The first measure uses the aggregate value of all the component elements (cash, stock and other securities) as the acquirer's offer. The second and third measures use the "final" and "initial" price offered by the acquirer. ***, **, and * indicate that the mean (median) merger premium is different across the fairness opinion sub-samples at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Table 6 Descriptive statistics for combined measure of merger premium (MP)
All Deals
The table contains means and medians (in parentheses) of the combined measure of merger premium (MP) for 1488 mergers and tender offers from 1980 to 2004. The premium offered to target shareholders is computed as the percentage the acquirer's offer is above the market value of the target's shares four weeks prior to the announcement of the offer. MP is first computed using the aggregate value of all the component elements (cash, stock and other securities) of the acquirer's offer to target shareholders. If it fails to produces a value between 0% and 200%, it is recomputed using the final offer price. If the premium computed using the final price also fails to produce a value between 0% and 200%, it is recomputed using initial price offered. If the premium computed using the initial price still does not fall between 0% and 200%, the merger is deleted. It is this combined measure of merger premium (MP) that is used in all subsequent analyses in the paper. A deal is classified as having a conflicted fairness opinion if an institution providing a fairness opinion on the deal also has an advisory role in the merger. Similarly, a deal is classified as having an independent fairness opinion if an institution providing a fairness opinion on the deal has no advisory role in the merger. ***, ** and * indicate that the mean (median) merger premium is different from the mean (median) merger premium of the no fairness opinion sub-sample at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. an institution providing a fairness opinion on the deal also has an advisory role in the merger. Similarly, a deal is classified as having an independent fairness opinion if an institution providing a fairness opinion on the deal has no advisory role in the merger. ***, ** and * indicate that the mean (median) merger premium is different from the mean (median) merger premium of the no fairness opinion sub-sample at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. (-1,0) where the event day 0 is the merger announcement day. Abnormal returns are computed using a market model with an estimation period of 255 trading days ending 46 trading days before the event. MP is the combined measure of merger premium offered to target shareholders as defined in previous tables. TarFO and AcqFO are dummy variables equal to one if the deal has an institution providing a fairness opinion to the target and acquirer respectively and zero otherwise. TarConfFO and AcqConfFO are dummy variables equal to one if the deal advisor provides a fairness opinion on the target or acquirer side respectively and zero otherwise. All other independent variables are as defined in previous tables and the appendix. Heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate that the parameter estimate is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% or 10% respectively. Table 10 Fairness opinions, advisor reputation, fee structure, merger premiums and abnormal returns
Number
The regressions are based on a sample of 1488 merger and tender offer bids between 1980 and 2004. The dependent variables are MP, the combined measure of the merger premium offered to target shareholders as defined in previous tables and the target's (acquirer's) cumulative abnormal return over the window (-1,0) where the event day 0 is the merger announcement day. Abnormal returns are computed using a market model with an estimation period of 255 trading days ending 46 trading days before the event. The dummy variables TarFO, AcqFO, TarConfFO and AcqConfFO are as defined in previous tables. TarHirep and AcqHirep are dummy variables equal to one if the institution advising the target or acquirer respectively on the deal is among the top ten advisors in the M&A market over the sample period and zero otherwise. TarContingent and AcqContingent are dummy variables equal to one if the institution advising the target or acquirer respectively on the deal had a fee contract that was contingent on the consummation of the deal and zero otherwise. TarInsider is a dummy that takes on the value of one if the percentage of shares owned by insiders is less than the sample median value of 5.79% and zero otherwise. TarInsideBoard is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the board is dominated by insider (> 50%) and zero otherwise. Other independent variables as defined in the appendix are included in all regressions but are not presented in the table. T-statistics computed after correcting the standard errors for heteroskedasticity and cross sectional clustering across observations involving the same acquirer are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate that the parameter estimate is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% or 10% respectively. 
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